Walter Cronkite was the CBS News Anchor for most of the Vietnam Era. People in America believed and trusted Cronkite.Nothing demonstrates the influence of the media in determining the outcome of the Vietnam war as much a broadcast from Walter Cronkite on February 27, 1968.

Mr. Cronkite's statement :

"Tonight, back in more familiar surroundings, in New York, We'd like to sum up our findings in Vietnam. An analyses that must be speculative, personal, subjective.
Who won.. 'n'.. who lost ..... in the great Tet offensive against the cities? I'm not sure.
The Viet Cong did not win by a knock out but neither did we and the referees of history may make it a draw. Another standoff may be coming in the big battles expected south of the Demilitarized Zone. Khe San could well fall with a terrible loss in American lives, prestige and moral.

And this is a tragedy of our stubbornness there. But the bastion no longer is a key to the rest of the northern regions and it is doubtful that the American forces can be defeated across the breadth of the DMZ with any substantial loss of ground ...... Another standoff.

On the political front, past performance gives no confidence that the Vietnamese government can cope with its problems, now compounded by the attack on the cities. It may not fall. It may hold on. But it probably won't show the dynamic qualities demanded of this young nation ......... Another standoff.

We have been too often disappointed by the optimism of the American leaders, both in Vietnam and Washington, to have faith any longer in the silver linings they find in the darkest clouds. They may be right that Hanoi's winter/spring offensive has been forced by the Communist realization that they could not win the longer war of attrition. And that the Communists hope that any success in the offensive will improve their position for eventual negotiations. It would improve their position and it would also require our realization.... that we should have had all along..... That any negotiations must be that .... negotiations not the dictation of peace terms.

For it seems now, more certain than ever, that the bloody experience of Vietnam is to end in a stalemate.

This summer's almost certain standoff will either end in real give and take negotiations or terrible escalation. And for every means we have to escalate the enemy can match us. And that applies to invasion of the north, the use of nuclear weapons or the mere commitment of 100 ... or 200.... or 300 thousand more American troops to the battle. And with each escalation, the world comes closer to the brink of cosmic disaster.

To say that we are closer to victory today, is to believe, in the face of the evidence, the optimists who have been wrong in the past.

To suggest we are on the edge of defeat, is to yield to unreasonable pessimism.

To say that we are mired in stalemate, seems the only realistic if unsatisfactory conclusion.

On the off chance the military and political analysts are right, in the next few months we must test the enemy's intentions. In case this is indeed his last big gasp before negotiations.
But it is increasingly clear to this reporter that the only rational way out, then, will be to negotiate. Not as victors but as an honorable people who lived up to their pledge to defend democracy and did the best they could.
This is Walter Cronkite. Goodnight. "

Let's take a closer look at what Mr. Cronkite had to say.
"We'd like to sum up our findings in Vietnam. An analyses that must be speculative, personal, subjective. "
Speculative and subjective are accurate terms to describe the feelings and the opinions issued here. The problem comes in the other adjective ... PERSONAL.
Mr. Cronkite was not an editorialist. He was a reporter. His job was to report the news as he saw it happen just the facts of the battle not his opinion of what was going to happen. Mr. Cronkite himself has been quoted as saying," The mark of a professional journalist is that we do adhere to an ethic. A professional journalist recognizes his or her prejudices and biases and
avoids them in writing and reporting. There's no place in journalism for biased reporting on the front page. There is no place for subjective, personal opinions to creep in.
As even he (Walter Cronkite) has admitted, he skewed the news on Vietnam to suit his agenda. Walter you should have taken your own advice!

The Viet Cong did not win by a knock out but neither did we and the referees of history may make it a draw.
As discussed earlier we did win by a knock out. The Viet Cong were devastated. 32,000 communist solders were killed and another 5,800 detained from January 29 and February 11. By the end of February, the number had risen to over 45,000 killed. The total number of enemy committed to the Tet offensive was 84,000. This represents a loss percentage of almost 54% the allied forces by contrast lost 1,001 Americans and 2,082 Vietnamese and other Allied Personnel.

The NVA 1st Division was soundly defeated by the American 4th Infantry Division and the ARVN 42d Regiment around Dac To. Even though the American and ARVN forces were out numbered 2 to 1.
Maybe Mr. Cronkite should have looked at the real scoreboard before he made his editorial. An example of subjective and personal judgment by Mr. Cronkite.
Khe San could well fall with a terrible loss in American lives, prestige and moral. And this is a tragedy of our stubbornness there. But the bastion no longer is a key to the rest of the northern regions and it is doubtful that the American forces can be defeated across the breadth of the DMZ with any substantial loss of ground ...... Another standoff.

I will admit the base at Khe Sanh was an example of our stubbornness. The base had lost its importance before the siege. That said, the fact remains the Marines proved they could hold Khe Sanh as long as they wanted with a loss ratio of 10 to 1. The closing of the base at Khe Sanh did result in some loss in moral simply because the marines who fought there were proud of their victory and did not want that battle to be turned into an American loss as it rapidly was by both the North Vietnamese and the American press. This standoff was again in the eyes of Mr. Cronkite. Speculative and subjective.

We have been too often disappointed by the optimism of the American leaders, both in Vietnam and Washington, to have faith any longer in the silver linings they find in the darkest clouds. They may be right that Hanoi's winter/spring offensive has been forced by the Communist realization that they could not win the longer war of attrition. And that the Communists hope that any success in the offensive will improve their position for eventual negotiations.

Had Mr. Cronkite and others like him not made their statements about the war in Vietnam, the North Vietnamese would have surrendered shortly after the losses of Tet. Instead, they held on realizing that they could not win on the battle field but the would be able to win the war in Vietnam in the streets of America and in the halls of congress.

On the political front, past performance gives no confidence that the Vietnamese government can cope with its problems, now compounded by the attack on the cities. It may not fall. It may hold on. But it probably won't show the dynamic qualities demanded of this young nation ......... Another standoff.

The government of South Vietnam did not collapse under this blow. Instead, it rallied in the face of the threat with a unity and purpose greater than that which had ever been displayed up to that time. The greatest blow to the enemy's hopes and plans was the fact that there was no evidence of significant participation by the population in support of the enemy. In other words, the general uprising simply did not occur.

To the contrary, following the Tet offensive, the Government showed a willingness to place arms for self-defense in the hands of civilian inhabitants of cities, towns and hamlets -- a willingness it had never previously shown. Although the fight was touch-and-go in many places at the outset, no South Vietnamese military units were destroyed and their casualties were relatively low considering the heavy engagements they fought. These dynamic qualities continued until the US abandoned South Vietnam at the negotiation table.